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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2017
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV KJUS AR FBI
SUBJECT: AMIA UPDATE: ARGENTINA LIKELY TO REQUEST QUIET USG
SUPPORT IN LEAD-UP TO INTERPOL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEETING

REF: 1. BUENOS AIRES 182 2. BUENOS AIRES 93 3. BUENOS AIRES 43

Classified By: DCM Michael Matera for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

(C) SUMMARY. DCM met February 1 with MFA Ambassador Guillermo Gonzalez (who has the lead on the AMIA case) to discuss GOA strategy to prepare for the March Interpol Executive Committee meeting that will likely decide whether Red Notices will be issued for the arrest of the nine suspects in the July 1994 AMIA bombing. Gonzalez communicated his shock at the GOI threats delivered at the January 22 meeting in Lyon (Ref 1) and noted that the GOA would need and appreciate the quiet, closely coordinated support of the USG as it prepares for the March 13-15 meeting. GOA strategy and plans for the March meeting remain undetermined but are being discussed already with the Foreign Minister; however, Gonzalez mentioned that $\hat{\textbf{U}}.\textbf{S}.$ support in lobbying Executive Committee members prior to the meeting would be important given very weak links between Argentina and a number of the countries represented on the Executive Committee. He asked however that we await an official communication from the MFA on this, as the final GOA position has not been decided. DCM was non-committal on USG willingness to play an active role with Interpol Executive Committee members but suggested that the visit of Attorney General Gonzales and Under Secretary Burns and Assistant Secretary Shannon to Buenos Aires next week was the perfect

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opportunity to discuss these issues. Embassy expects that the GOA will take advantage of these visits for this purpose. END SUMMARY.

Revisiting the Lyon Encounter

12. (C) On February 1, DCM and POLOFF met with MFA Ambassador Guillermo Gonzalez, leader of the GOA delegation to the January 22 Interpol meeting in Lyon, France (Refs 1, 2) and lead official at the MFA on the AMIA issue. Gonzalez relayed his impression that the Interpol meeting was "complicated" and "difficult". He stated that he

was "astonished" by the GOI reaction to the GOA's presentation, which included personal threats against the Argentine special prosecutors. Gonzalez characterized the Iranian response as "undiplomatic" and conveyed that he was taken aback by the actions of the otherwise formal and well-structured GOI delegation. It was surprising to him, he said, that the Iranian delegation made the threats not once, but three times.

GOA to Provide Supplemental Information to Interpol

13. (C) According to Ambassador Gonzalez, Argentine special prosecutor Nisman had presented an 8-9 page written memo to Interpol during the January 22 presentation in Lyon, and he indicated that amplifying details would be provided to Interpol on February 2, upon completion of their translation into English. This supplemental information will serve to bolster the GOA's initial submission to Interpol in November 2006 that was judged to be very weak by Interpol authorities. The details include arguments against each of the 9 AMIA suspects and will be transmitted directly from Interpol Buenos Aires to Interpol Lyon. Upon evaluating this and the information presented on January 22, Interpol's legal affairs office will craft and present a recommendation to its Executive Committee on whether to issue Red Notices for the arrest of each of the AMIA bombing suspects.

Interpol Executive Committee Meeting Scheduled

14. (C) Ambassador Gonzalez confirmed that the Interpol Executive Committee meeting has been firmly scheduled for March 13-15. However, no decision has yet been made

regarding where the AMIA Red Notice issue will fall on the agenda. In addition to the Interpol Executive Committee members, delegations from the GOA and GOI are expected to attend. Gonzalez noted that the GOA has not yet decided as to the make-up of the delegation for the March meeting; however, the political importance of the meeting and the need for a positive outcome for the GOA are clearly recognized by the MFA and the GOA.

Argentina Formulating Strategy, Expects a Positive Outcome

15. (C) MFA Ambassador Gonzalez conveyed to DCM that while several proposals on how the GOA will prepare for the Interpol Executive Committee meeting have been forwarded to Foreign Minister Taiana, Gonzalez has not yet received instructions on how to proceed. However, Gonzalez expressed cautious optimism that six of the nine Red Notice requests would likely be approved by the Interpol Executive Committee. However, he said he doubts whether Interpol will approve those for former Iranian President Rafsanjani and former Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Velayati. Gonzalez also noted that because Argentina's previous efforts in 2005 to extradite former Iranian Ambassador to Argentina Soleimanpour had been unsuccessful, Interpol will likely handle the Red Notice request on Soleimanpour very carefully this time around and that this is the third request that may not be finally approved by the Executive Committee.

_____ GOA Likely to Request "Quiet," Coordinated Assistance

(C) Ambassador Gonzalez expressed the need for Argentina to remain out in front of this issue, and requested the "subtle, quiet, coordinated support" of the United States. He asked that we await an official request from the GOA, since the final GOA strategy had not yet been blessed by the Foreign Minister and other senior GOA officials. While the GOA continues to formulate its strategy for moving forward,

and it does not expect to have any specific requests of the USG prior to next Monday, Gonzalez did express concerns that it does not have any mechanism to reach out to several members of the Interpol Executive Committee prior to the March 13-15 meeting. Gonzalez suggested to DCM that the GOA would very likely need and soon request assistance in reaching out to "hard-to-reach" members, including the representatives of Russia, Korea, India, Italy, and the South African President of the Executive Committee. The GOA has very limited relations with Korea and India and with others (Italy, South Africa, Russia) its relations in law enforcement are not deep. Gonzalez also indicated that the GOA would likely want to meet in Washington with Tom Fuentes, USG representative to the Interpol Executive Committee and Special Agent in Charge of the FBI's Office of International Relations. DCM was non-committal as to the ultimate willingness of the USG to actively engage with other Executive Committee members but noted that next week's visits by Attorney General Gonzales and $\ensuremath{\text{U/S}}$ Burns and $\ensuremath{\text{A/S}}$ Shannon would be opportune times for the GOA to engage senior USG officials in discussion on these matters. WAYNE